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UN Reform and NATO Transformation: 
The Missing Link
DICK A. LEURDIJK
Senior Research Fellow, 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’
Introduction
From NATO’s perspective, Kofi Annan’s report In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security and Human Rights for All at first sight seemed hardly
relevant.1 In dealing with regional organizations, it nowhere explicitly men-
tioned the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This was all the more
surprising because Annan thus bypassed NATO’s active involvement in the
implementation of a number of post-conflict peace-building settlements, based
on UN Security Council resolutions, in areas such as Kosovo, Afghanistan and
Iraq. In the weeks after the publication of Annan’s report, NATO’s Secretary-
General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, on several occasions expressed his support for
his UN counterpart’s reform package. In a keynote address in Brussels, among
others, he argued that ‘NATO will increasingly act in concert with other insti-
tutions’, including the UN, pointing at NATO’s cooperation on the ground in
the Balkans and Afghanistan, while adding:
However, we need to raise our sights beyond ad hoc cooperation on the
ground. We need structured relationships at the institutional level as well
– to coordinate strategically, not just cooperate tactically. We need to
establish such relationships with the UN.2
In this context, he referred to his address to the Security Council in 2004, the
first ever by a NATO Secretary-General, saying ‘Kofi Annan’s recent proposals
for UN reform provide further opportunities for fresh thinking’. However, it is
hard, not to say impossible, to find any ‘fresh thinking’ on the relationship
between the UN and NATO in Annan’s report. One could even argue that the
1. In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, report of the
UN Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005.
2. ‘Reinventing NATO: Does the Alliance Reflect the Changing Nature of Transatlantic Security?’,
keynote address by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 24 May 2005, http://
www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050524a.htm. See also ‘Liberty as a Security Policy Challenge’,
speech by NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the 35th ISC Symposium, 19 May
2005, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050519b.htm.
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same holds true for the broader issue of the relationship between the UN and
regional organizations. On the one hand, Annan recognized in his report that ‘a
considerable number of regional and sub-regional organizations are now active
around the world, making important contributions to the stability and prosper-
ity of their members, as well as of the broader international system’.3 NATO had
played a key role in this development, given its involvement in the wars in the
Balkans in the 1990s. The notion, however, was not further elaborated by
Annan. On the other hand, the only recommendation that he made with respect
to regional organizations was to create ‘strategic reserves’ in support of the UN,
aimed at improving the UN’s deployment options for ‘peacekeeping’. Notwith-
standing Annan’s call for ‘a decisive move forward’, his recommendation for the
establishment of ‘an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities’ was but a
small step compared to the calls, in recent years, for further clarification and
formalization of the relationships between the UN and regional organizations,
and has nothing to do with the kind of fresh thinking about which de Hoop
Scheffer was talking.
It is against the broader background of evolving relationships between the UN
and regional organizations that this paper analyses the relevance for NATO of
Kofi Annan’s report In Larger Freedom, in an extremely dynamic environment
in which the UN and NATO, since the 1990s, have developed their operational
cooperation in the field, in different formats (politically, militarily, legally and
conceptually), in areas such as the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Afghanistan,
Iraq and Darfur.
The UN and NATO: An Uneasy Relationship
• The UN Charter
In conceptualizing the United Nations as a collective security system, the
authors of the UN Charter were confronted, among other things, with the con-
flicting demands of universalism and regionalism as alternative approaches to
world peace. The failure of the League of Nations had led some to advocate a
return to security systems based on regionalism. When delegates from 50
nations met in San Francisco in April 1945 to discuss the text of the UN Charter,
the clash between the two approaches, in the words of former UN Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali, became ‘one of the most explosive issues’, even to the
3. The publication of Annan’s report coincided with a broad international effort to assist the Afri-
can Union (AU) with its mission in Darfur, involving close cooperation from the UN, the AU,
NATO and the European Union.
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extent that ‘the issue posed a threat to the success of the San Francisco Confer-
ence and to the prospect of the United Nations itself’. 4
Inis Claude remarked that the atmosphere in San Francisco was affected by the
necessity of making ‘the bow to regionalism’, while others, such as the French
authors Cot and Pellet, underlined that the integration of regionalism in the UN
Charter was indeed only accepted ‘à contre coeur’.5 Another characteristic of
the positioning of regional organizations in the UN structure was their relative
subordination to the Security Council, with its primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security. Against this background, it
should not come as a surprise that the provisions of Chapter VIII in the UN
Charter on Regional Organizations have through the years been considered
ambiguous and inconsistent, and have remained controversial. Boutros-Ghali
pointed out that the founding fathers opted for an ‘uneasy compromise’ between
regionalism and internationalism. However, as a consequence of the Cold War,
these provisions were never put to the test. So it remained unclear as to what the
practical meaning would be of what was seen for many years as another ‘forgot-
ten chapter’ of the UN Charter – next to Chapter VII.
The end of the Cold War led to increased involvement of the UN in regional
conflict resolution and an overload of commitments for the settlement of such
crisis situations. Given its lack of resources, the UN had to acknowledge that it
was unable to do the job alone, and, with no intention of monopolizing peace
processes, it appealed to regional organizations for assistance. This development
would finally lead to a new approach to regional organizations. In his 1991
annual report, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali spoke of ‘a resurgent
regionalism’. In the following year he acknowledged the role of regional organ-
izations in many of the cases in which the UN had been active, writing:
My aim is to see that in any new division of labour, the United Nations
retains its primacy in the maintenance of international peace and security,
while its burden is lightened and its mission reinforced and underlined by
the active involvement of appropriate regional agencies. The exact
modalities of this division of labour remain to be worked out, as regional
organizations, no less than the United Nations itself, redefine their mis-
sions in the post-Cold War period.6
4. Press Release SG/SM/4929, 17 February 1993.
5. Inis L. Claude Jr, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organi-
zation (London : University of London Press, 1965) ; and Jean-Pierre Cot and Alain Pellet, La
Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article (Paris: Economica, 1985), pp. 795-837.
6. See, inter alia, Amitav Acharya, ‘Regional Organizations and UN Peacekeeping’, in: Ramesh
Tharkur, A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s (Boulder CO: Westview, 1995),
pp. 207-222.
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It was in this broader context of reforming ‘the structure of our approach’,
including a conceptual framework, that he saw new opportunities for closer
cooperation between the UN and regional organizations:
What is clear … is that regional arrangements and agencies in many cases
possess a potential that should be utilized in serving the functions [of] …
preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict
peace-building. Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will con-
tinue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace
and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delega-
tion and cooperation with United Nations’ efforts could not only lighten
the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of partic-
ipation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.7
It was in this climate of the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War that
the hidden potential of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter was reinvigorated.
Already in February 1995, the UN Secretary-General referred to the fact that
‘The Security Council has on several occasions shown that it was prepared to
delegate, either to States or to ad hoc multi-nation forces, the responsibility for
intervening in emergency conflict situations’. From this he drew the conclusion
that ‘The time thus seems to have come for Chapter VIII’, adding, ‘Together, the
United Nations and the regional organizations can make an effective contribu-
tion to peacekeeping, provided that they take a rigorous approach and are capa-
ble of envisaging new forms of institutional cooperation’.8
Mainly as a consequence of the disintegration of the former Republic of Yugo-
slavia (FRY), the issue of the relationship between the UN and regional organi-
zations in the early 1990s would focus on the emerging cooperation between the
UN and NATO in the Balkans in the European theatre.
• The Washington Treaty
Just as the clash between universalism and regionalism became ‘one of the most
explosive issues’ in the run-up to the founding of the UN, the establishment of
NATO in 1949 was complicated by a similar explosive issue on the modalities
of NATO’s relationship to the UN. At the time, some argued that NATO was
both a regional arrangement within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the UN
Charter, as well as a collective defence system under Article 51 of the UN Char-
7. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, A/47/277 – S/24111 (New York: United Nations,
June 1992).
8. ‘Address by the Secretary-General of the United Nations upon Receiving a Doctorate Honoris
Causa from the University of Vienna’, Vienna, 27 February 1995.
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ter. Others objected strongly to any reference whatsoever, fearing that all action
taken by NATO should be subject to the veto of the Security Council, thereby
undermining its very nature as a collective defence organization. It was finally
agreed that while any specific reference in the preamble to Chapter VIII of the
UN Charter would be omitted, member states, in their public statements, should
stress the relationship of the Alliance to Article 51 of the UN Charter. Writing
about his involvement in the negotiations on the text of the Washington Treaty,
one British diplomat, Sir Nicholas Henderson, noted: ‘Listening to the bitter
debates on the Preamble, it was difficult at moments to believe in that singleness
of spirit of the North Atlantic community which the Preamble itself was meant
to epitomize and proclaim’.
It was only in the Balkans in the 1990s, when the UN and NATO started their
cooperation in the field, that NATO had to define its relationship with the UN
under operational circumstances. It would take until 1999 before the Alliance
finally defined the bottom line of this relationship, preserving its right to decide
autonomously on the use of force, without a formal authorization by the UN
Security Council, given its character as a collective defence organization. The
extensive debate among NATO members on the justification for the use of force,
while bypassing the UN Security Council, was nothing less than a repetition of
arguments along the same lines as 40 years before – back to the roots. NATO’s
Operation ‘Allied Force’ in Kosovo, however, did not prevent the UN and
NATO from developing an exceptional and dynamic relationship, given their
common involvement in the settlement of conflicts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq
and Darfur.
• Annan’s Call for ‘Radical Changes’
Kofi Annan’s reform package of 101 recommendations was derived from two
reports that were commissioned by Annan himself: one dealing with the imple-
mentation of the so-called Millennium Development Goals, as defined by the
UN summit on the occasion of the millennium commemoration in 2000; the
other by a High-level Panel dealing with the UN’s collective security system in
the aftermath of the war against Iraq. In his statement to the General Assembly
in September 2003, Annan expressed his concerns about the future viability of
the UN’s system of collective security, announcing his intention to establish the
High-level Panel:
Since this Organization was founded, States have generally sought to deal
with threats to the peace through containment and deterrence, by a sys-
tem based on collective security and the United Nations Charter.
Article 51 of the Charter prescribes that all States, if attacked, retain the
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inherent right of self-defence. But until now it has been understood that
when States go beyond that, and decide to use force to deal with broader
threats to international peace and security, they need the unique legiti-
macy provided by the United Nations.
Now, some say this understanding is no longer tenable, since an ‘armed
attack’ with weapons of mass destruction could be launched at any time,
without warning, or by a clandestine group.
Rather than wait for that to happen, they argue, States have the right and
obligation to use force pre-emptively, even on the territory of other States,
and even while weapons systems that might be used to attack them are
still being developed.
According to this argument, States are not obliged to wait until there is
agreement in the Security Council. Instead, they reserve the right to act
unilaterally, or in ad hoc coalitions.
This logic represents a fundamental challenge to the principles on which,
however imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the last 58
years.
My concern is that, if it were to be adopted, it could set precedents that
resulted in a proliferation of the unilateral and lawless use of force, with
or without justification.
But it is not enough to denounce unilateralism, unless we also face up
squarely to the concerns that make some States feel uniquely vulnerable,
since it is those concerns that drive them to take unilateral action. We
must show that those concerns can, and will, be addressed effectively
through collective action.
Excellencies, we have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment
no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded.
(…)
Now we must decide whether it is possible to continue on the basis agreed
then, or whether radical changes are needed.’ 9
Never before had a Secretary-General of the UN had the courage to initiate so
fundamentally a discussion about the foundations for international cooperation
in maintaining international peace and security within the framework of the
UN. It was a dramatic call to re-establish the relevance of the UN, as a result of
the combined effects of Kosovo (1999), ‘9/11’ (2001) and the war in Iraq
(2003). In all of these cases, the international community had been sharply
divided on the application of the UN’s system of collective security, including the
conditions for the use of force for self-defence, taking into account the new
9. ‘Secretary-General’s Address to the General Assembly’, Office of the Spokesman, 23 September
2003, http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=517.
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security threats of the twenty-first century, or for humanitarian purposes under
conditions of an ‘impending humanitarian catastrophy’. This debate also
touched on the possible role for both the UN itself, in terms of prevention,
peacekeeping or post-conflict peace-building, as well as for the regional organi-
zations, including NATO.
• In Larger Freedom From Fear
While emphasizing their complementary roles, in terms of the broader issue of
the relationship between the UN and regional organizations, Kofi Annan paid
relatively little attention in his report to regional organizations. Their role was
discussed in no more than five paragraphs. Furthermore, in supporting a
stronger relationship between the UN and regional organizations, it should be
emphasized that Annan’s recommendations in this respect were strictly limited
to ‘peacekeeping’, as traditionally understood within the UN’s conceptual
framework. The Secretary-General appealed to member states to ‘do more’ to
ensure that the UN has effective capacities for peacekeeping. In particular, he
urged them to improve the UN’s ‘deployment options’ by creating ‘strategic
reserves’ that can be deployed rapidly, arguing that decisions by the European
Union to create stand-by battle groups, for instance, and by the African Union
to create African reserve capacities, are ‘a very valuable complement to our own
efforts’. In suggesting that ‘the time is now ripe for a decisive move forward’, the
UN Secretary-General thus recommended the establishment of ‘an interlocking
system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United Nations to work
with relevant regional organizations in predictable and reliable partnerships’. In
this context, he announced his intention to introduce memoranda of under-
standing that should govern the sharing of information, expertise and resources,
aimed at improving coordination between the UN and individual regional
organizations. For regional organizations that have a conflict prevention or
peacekeeping capacity, these memoranda of understanding could place those
capacities within the framework of the United Nations Stand-by Arrangement
System (UNSAS), Annan wrote, suggesting elsewhere in the report that such
regional organizations ‘consider the option’ of placing such capacities in the
framework of UNSAS.10
In presenting this extremely modest recommendation, Kofi Annan followed the
reasoning of the High-level Panel. In its report, the Panel paid more attention to
the relationship between the UN and regional organizations. It suggested that
10. The system of stand-by arrangements is specifically designed for peacekeeping missions by and
under the command of the UN. See Dick A. Leurdijk (ed.), A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade:
Strengthening the Capacity for Quick Response (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International
Relations ‘Clingendael’, 1995).
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the UN and any regional organization with which it works do so ‘in a more
integrated fashion than has up to now occurred’. Among the suggestions that
the Panel mentions are formalizing cooperation between the UN and regional
organizations in an agreement and, indeed, the placing of peacekeeping capaci-
ties from regional organizations in the framework of UNSAS. (For a comparison
of the recommendations of the Panel and Kofi Annan, see Annexe 1). Further-
more, other than In Larger Freedom, the report of the High-level Panel, in dis-
cussing regional organizations, contained a separate paragraph on NATO:
In recent years, such alliance organizations as NATO (which have not
usually been considered regional organizations within the meaning of
Chapter VIII of the Charter but have similar characteristics) have under-
taken peacekeeping operations beyond their mandated areas. We wel-
come this so long as these operations are authorized by and accountable
to the Security Council. In the case of NATO, there may also be a con-
structive role for it to play in assisting in the training and equipping of
less-well-resourced regional organizations and States.
Annan has chosen not to copy this paragraph in his own report, probably delib-
erately avoiding any discussion beyond the concept of ‘peacekeeping’. The par-
agraph indeed raises a number of questions: in the first place, it identifies NATO
(rightly) as a regional organization outside the meaning of Chapter VIII; sec-
ondly, it contributes to the all too familiar conceptual confusion regarding the
notion of ‘peacekeeping’ – the reference to NATO’s out-of-area ‘peacekeeping
operations’ concerns the deployment of NATO troops in areas such as Kosovo
and Afghanistan as part of military missions with a ‘peace-enforcement’ man-
date under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; thirdly, in referring to the issue of
authorization for the use of force by regional organizations, the Panel, of course,
had in mind NATO’s deliberate decision to bypass the Security Council during
its actions in Kosovo in 1999; and, fourthly, the reference to NATO’s potential
contribution to the training and equipping of other ‘less-well-resourced regional
organizations and States’ was probably inspired by the ongoing debate within
NATO about the setting up of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan,
in support of both the Afghan government and the UN mission in the country,
the establishment of a training mission in Iraq, and a possible supporting role
for NATO, in close cooperation with the UN and the European Union, in pro-
viding logistics, including airlift, for an AU mission in Darfur, Sudan.
Against this background, there was every reason to believe that Annan would
have incorporated a much broader discussion on the relationship between the
UN and regional organizations in his report, and more in particular on relations
between the UN and NATO, given their agendas in terms of reform and transi-
tion, respectively.
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• NATO Transformation: The Aftermath of ‘9/11’
Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the US, NATO’s main
concern in terms of the ‘new threats of the twenty-first century’ became interna-
tional terrorism, linked with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
This perception was translated in the formulation of a transformation agenda
that was adopted at the Alliance summit in Prague in November 2002. Since
then, NATO has been actively engaged in the implementation of this roadmap,
aimed at repositioning NATO as a full-fledged instrument in the ‘war’, the
‘fight’, or the ‘campaign’ against international terrorism.
The common element in the responses worldwide to the terror attacks was a
reinvigoration of the concept of the right to self-defence, individually and col-
lectively. While the US used the argument as the main justification for the start
of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’, the UN Security Council, by referring to Arti-
cle 51 of the UN Charter, at best gave a tacit agreement to the operation in
Afghanistan and not an explicit authorization for the use of force, as some have
suggested. For NATO, the most immediate consequence of ‘9/11’ was its his-
toric decision on 3 October 2001 to invoke formally, for the first time, Article 5
of the Washington Treaty.11 With the implementation of this decision, NATO
initiated a transformation process that would have profound consequences for
its role as a collective defence organization.
Notwithstanding its invocation of Article 5, the Atlantic Alliance was bypassed by
the US when it started its ‘war on terrorism’ with Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’
in early October 2001. NATO’s contribution, for the time being, was limited to
operations in the air and at sea. It sent AWACS radar airplanes to the US for
‘backfilling’ purposes. NATO’s maritime contribution – Operation ‘Active
Endeavour’ – was initially aimed at enhancing the security of the sea-lanes in the
eastern Mediterranean.12 Since then, the North Atlantic Council has decided, in
two stages, to expand its naval operations, firstly to the Straits of Gibraltar (in
February 2003), and finally (in March 2004) to the Mediterranean Sea as a whole.
The North Atlantic Council’s position in the immediate aftermath of ‘9/11’
raised a number of fundamental legal questions, such as the identification of the
terror attacks as falling under the terms of Article 5. The Council, however,
justified its concerns about the attacks in terms of a legitimate interest for the
11. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty states ‘that an armed attack against one or more of the
Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all’.
12. Under this operation, NATO air and naval forces have been carrying out patrolling and surveil-
lance activities in the operational area east of Sicily, aimed at safeguarding the ships of NATO
nations against the threat of terrorism.
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Alliance, by referring to NATO’s 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts, which
already included references to international terrorism as part of its commitment
to collective self-defence. The December 2001 semi-annual ministerial meeting
thus became the beginning of a new transitional phase, based on a transforma-
tion agenda, which aimed at formulating, in the words of (then) US Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, a new ‘job description’ for NATO, saying:
‘Fighting terrorism, which has been so clearly linked to weapons of mass
destruction, is part of NATO’s basic job description: collective defence’, adding,
‘Article 5 threats can come from anywhere, in many forms’. This meant an effort
at repositioning the Alliance as a collective defence organization in a completely
new security environment, compared to the time of NATO’s establishment,
implying profound conceptual, operational and political adaptations with
respect to the concept of self-defence, including its traditional ‘out-of-area’
notion and the notion of ‘pre-emptive attacks’.
As a collective defence organization, NATO’s main concern was initially to safe-
guard the territory of its member states from an armed attack. Its willingness in
the early 1990s to support the UN in its peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans was
no less than a revolutionary break with its past policies, provoking extensive
legal discussions on the issue of NATO’s legitimacy in acting ‘out-of-area’ along
its periphery. Similar discussions were held during the Kosovo crisis a couple of
years later, this time, furthermore, in combination with the question of whether
the Alliance was entitled to use force without having explicit authorization from
the UN Security Council. The question of NATO’s response to ‘9/11’ would lead
to a third round of out-of-area discussions, much to the dismay of NATO’s Sec-
retary-General Lord Robertson. Where his predecessor, Solana, had suggested
in the autumn of 1998 that ‘We must not enter into a legalistic debate’ on Kos-
ovo, on what he saw as an essentially ‘political matter’, Lord Robertson explic-
itly indicated in several interviews in March 2002 that NATO’s adaptation to
the new security threats would also include a capability to operate far beyond
its own borders, presenting this as a kind of logical extension of NATO’s per-
formance in south-eastern Europe, its own backyard, in the preceding decade.
NATO’s transformation from a regional actor into a global player was formally
confirmed by the foreign ministers at their meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002,
declaring that the Alliance would confront threats to members’ security, no mat-
ter what their origin. One year later, Lord Robertson emphasized that the May
2002 decision required that ‘NATO should step above its traditional theological
squabbles’, basically declaring the ‘out-of-area’ debate as ‘dead’. In August 2003
NATO would take over command of the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) in Afghanistan, the first NATO-led peace-support operation far away
from its own territory, and well outside the ‘Euro-Atlantic area’.
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Another conceptual adaptation, furthermore, was related to the inclusion of
‘pre-emptive action’ as part of NATO’s interpretation of ‘self-defence’. Here,
again, Lord Robertson quite convincingly supported the position of the Bush
administration, disregarding the international legal questions that were being
raised by such a broad conceptualization of the concept of self-defence. He
explicitly included pre-emption as part of NATO’s response to the threats of
terrorist attacks, by saying that NATO forces should also be better able ‘to deter,
pre-empt and defeat’ attacks, adding in October 2003 that NATO had already
acted pre-emptively in Kosovo in 1999, and concluding that there was nothing
new about pre-emption: it had always been a part of NATO’s deterrence pack-
age, he said.
Cases of cooperation
• Afghanistan
With the start of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ on 7 October 2001, the United
States initiated the first phase in what it called the ‘war on terrorism’. The delib-
erate decision on the part of the Bush administration not to involve NATO was
the result of a combination of considerations, such as the US’s preference to keep
tight control of the military campaign, both because its own national security
interests were at stake but also as a consequence of the key lesson of Operation
‘Allied Force’ as a model of ‘warfare by coalition’. At the time, this raised serious
questions about NATO’s marginalization or irrelevance.
After the fall of the Taliban regime in Kabul, the results of the Bonn Conference,
which was held in December 2001, provided for agreement on a phased political
transition process for Afghanistan and the deployment of a multinational force
– the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – initially under the com-
mand of the United Kingdom as the ‘lead nation’, and authorized by the UN
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.13
After some early indications in that direction, in April 2002 NATO offered to
carry out the planning for ISAF in an effort to encourage Turkey to take over
command of the multinational force from the British in June 2002.14 The deci-
13. S/RES/1378, 14 November 2001; and S/RES/1386, 20 December 2001.
14. The offer involved identifying the precise forces that are needed from an array of countries and
determining when and where they should be deployed. The task is a relatively routine one, in terms
of force generation and force planning, for SHAPE, NATO’s European military headquarters at
Mons in Belgium.
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sion was presented as part of a broader effort by NATO ‘to make itself more
relevant in the campaign against terrorism’, as stressed by Lord Robertson,15
and would lead to growing involvement by the Alliance after more NATO mem-
ber states took over the command (Italy, and Germany/the Netherlands) and
asked for similar support. This development finally led to a decision in spring
2003 that NATO as such would take over full command of ISAF. (Then) US
Secretary of State Colin Powell welcomed the announcement in mid-April 2003,
saying:
This will be NATO’s first significant military operation outside of Europe
in its history, and is a sign of the Alliance’s new direction and emphasis
on confronting the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction
from wherever they come … I am pleased that there continues to be
broad support for the efforts to stabilize Afghanistan as part of the Glo-
bal War against Terrorism.16
In early May 2003 on a visit to Washington, Lord Robertson said that the deci-
sion was ‘undoubtedly another watershed moment, as important as the first
NATO involvement in the Balkans’, adding that it was now ‘quite natural’ for
NATO to look beyond Afghanistan, to ‘consider a possible role for the Alliance
in post-conflict Iraq’ at a later time. When NATO assumed the leadership of
ISAF on 11 August 2003, a NATO press release read:
ISAF’s name and mission will not change. NATO will work within the
same United Nations mandate as ISAF III and will operate according to
current and future UN resolutions. NATO’s commitment to the ISAF mis-
sion is a reflection of our transformation agenda and the Alliance’s resolve
to address the new security challenges of the twenty-first century.17
On the same occasion, the US Department of State issued a statement declaring
that ‘This new mission for NATO represents NATO’s further transformation as
an Alliance that will meet the new security challenges of this century’, adding
15. In disclosing the decision, the NATO chief said that the Alliance had been making a direct con-
tribution to fighting terrorism by breaking up al-Qaeda cells in the Balkans and by sending its
AWACS planes to patrol American skies, and indirectly by defusing the crisis in Macedonia, thus
averting a broader conflict in the Balkans that might have distracted Washington while it was exe-
cuting Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan. He also asserted that NATO made it easier
for European countries and the US to work together in Afghanistan, underlining the need to close
the gap between US and European military capabilities. A Western diplomat was quoted as saying
of the plan to offer help to the Turks: ‘It shows imagination on the part of the Allies. NATO
doesn’t have to choose between running the mission itself or doing nothing. There are other things
it can do’, International Herald Tribune, 12 April 2002.
16. (Then) US Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, NATO’s Takeover of the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan (Washington DC: US Department of State, 18 April 2003).
17. Atlantic News, No. 3501, 21 August 2003.
academia-egmont.papers.10.book  Page 14  Wednesday, November 23, 2005  11:34 AMUN REFORM AND NATO TRANSFORMATION: THE MISSING LINK
15
further that ‘NATO will run its operations in Afghanistan much as it has man-
aged other successful peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedo-
nia’, explaining:
The Allies will exercise political control in the North Atlantic Council,
while NATO’s military headquarters will provide military expertise for
planning and operations. NATO’s new role in Afghanistan demonstrates
that the revitalization of the Alliance is becoming a reality, and that
NATO will go outside its traditional area of operations to meet threats
wherever they may arise.18
NATO’s first mission in Asia thus fitted perfectly within the parameters of the
sub-contracting model, in this case at the invitation of the provisional Afghan
government and formally authorized by the UN Security Council. This was
made perfectly clear when NATO, in October 2003, started to mull the possi-
bility of expanding its operations beyond Kabul, and Lord Robertson said that
it would first need specific authorization from the Security Council before it
could start deploying so-called ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ (PRTs).19 In
letters from NATO’s Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council,
the Alliance outlined its ‘longer-term strategy’ in Afghanistan:
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is in Afghanistan in its
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) role in order to support
the international community’s efforts towards implementation of the
Bonn Agreement, as mandated by the United Nations Security Council
resolution 1386 (2001). The aim is to assist in the emergence of a united
18. Press Statement, Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokesman, US Department of State, Washington
DC, 11 August 2003.
19. Initially, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) operated in Afghanistan within the frame-
work of the US-led Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’. After the fall of the Taliban regime, President
Bush promised to reconstruct Afghanistan. As part of a ‘hearts and minds’ operation, PRTs can be
seen as an ‘alternative reconstruction model’, aimed at providing both security and reconstruction
and humanitarian assistance for the local population by combining military and civilian personnel
in small, joint missions. According to a NATO Backgrounder, PRTs have successfully introduced a
measure of stability to their localities through patrolling, monitoring, influence and mediation,
thereby facilitating the reconstruction efforts of other international organizations and allowing the
central government in Kabul to extend control to the provinces of Afghanistan. The composition of
each team will vary slightly depending on location and will number 40 to 60 persons. Composed of
civil affairs soldiers who are trained in medicine, psychology, engineering and law, as well as Spe-
cial Forces and regular army units, the teams will always maintain a ‘robust’ capacity to defend
themselves, as they are being purposely deployed in hostile territory. For more background, see
ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), NATO Backgrounder, 21 January 2005, http://
www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/Backgrounder/BackPRT.htm; NATO in Afghanistan, NATO Factsheet,
21 February 2005, http://nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm; NATO in Afghanistan:
How Did This Operation Evolve?, NATO Topics, 15 February 2005, http://www.nato.int/issues/
afghanistan/evolution.htm; and Reconstruction: The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in
Afghanistan and its Role in Reconstruction, http://www.afgha.com/?af=article&sid+33553.
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and sovereign Afghanistan, with, inter alia, a broad-based, multi-ethnic
representative government, integrated into the international community
and cooperating with its neighbours.
The document added that NATO’s long-term strategy in this context includes
the formulation of an ‘Alliance political objective’, of a ‘desired ISAF end-state’
and of ‘benchmarks for an Alliance hand-over strategy’. NATO’s political objec-
tive was formulated as follows:
Support for implementation of the Bonn process, as mandated by Security
Council Resolution 1386 (2001), in cooperation and coordination with key
international organizations, in particular the United Nations and the European
Union, by assisting the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) to meet its respon-
sibility to provide security and order. Additional factors to consider in develop-
ing further the Alliance’s over-arching political objective include:
1. An expanded ISAF mandate will require a specific United Nations Security
Council resolution;
2. The need for enhanced coordination and cooperation between ISAF, the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Afghan
authorities, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs).
Key components of NATO’s ‘desired ISAF end-state’ included, inter alia, com-
pletion of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) pro-
gramme; build-up of the Afghan National Army (ANA); the establishment of a
functioning Afghan national police force and judiciary; implementation of effec-
tive counter-narcotics activities; the implementation of the constitutional Loya
Jirga (grand council) and approval of a new constitution; election of a represent-
ative government to succeed the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) through
free and fair elections; removal or modification of the behaviour of the war-
lords, bringing them into central government institutions; and the resolution of
the terrorist threat from the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other extremist groups.20
And, indeed, in adopting Resolution 1510 on 13 October 2003, the Security
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, thus authorized the
expansion of ISAF’s mandate ‘to allow it, as resources permit, to support the
Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security
in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs’. Following the UN
decision in mid-October 2003, NATO initialled the expansion of its assistance
from December 2003 onwards, in stages, through the deployment of an increas-
20. S/2003/970, 8 October 2003.
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ing number of PRTs, gradually covering the northern and western provinces of
Afghanistan respectively. In 2006, NATO plans to finalize stage three, and to be
present in the whole of the country, including the south and the relatively dan-
gerous south-eastern parts of the territory.
By adopting Resolution 1510, the UN Security Council also called upon ISAF ‘to
continue to work in close consultation’ with, inter alia, ‘the Operation Enduring
Freedom Coalition in the implementation of the force mandate’. In practical
terms, this meant for NATO both the establishment of new PRTs, but also the
incorporation of already existing PRTs that were operating under the command
of the US-led Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’. The transfer of PRTs from ‘Endur-
ing Freedom’ to ISAF basically lessened the burden on the US military in their
hunt for Osama Bin Laden, and established an indirect link between the two
missions. Against this background, it was not a surprise that in December 2003
both US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and (then) US Secretary of State Powell
suggested merging the two operations. In early 2004 NATO’s new Secretary-
General, however, said that he preferred ‘synergy’, for instance by the appoint-
ment of one central commander, rather than a ‘real merging’ of the missions. The
two suggestions raise questions about the relationships between the two missions
as initially two different ‘tracks’, including their mandates, with Operation
‘Enduring Freedom’ fighting against international terrorism, and ISAF contribut-
ing to ‘nation-building’ in a post-conflict peace-building environment. In late
February 2004, a NATO official reminded journalists that Article 5 of the Wash-
ington Treaty was still in force, and was being used as political cover for many
coalition activities in Afghanistan, such as the hunt for al-Qaeda and the Taliban
– suggesting implicitly that NATO’s role in commanding ISAF could be given an
additional dimension by linking it, as Powell had already indicated, to efforts ‘to
stabilize Afghanistan as part of the Global War against Terrorism’. The discus-
sion on merging the two missions again led to disagreement among NATO’s
member states, with the US government, supported by SACEUR, arguing that
there is no point in keeping both structures since the two operations are essen-
tially conducted by NATO member countries, and France and Germany arguing
that the two missions’ mandates are incompatible, given their respective peace-
building and counter-terrorism tasks.21 In late September 2005, there was no
longer talk of merger between the missions but rather how to organize closer
cooperation in terms of ‘synergy’. The details still have to be worked out.22
21. Atlantic News, No. 3602, 31 August 2004; and No. 3616, 14 October 2004.
22. Atlantic News, No. 3706, 13 September 2005.
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• Iraq
NATO as such was not involved in Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ in 2003. That was
not to say, however, that ‘Iraq’ was not relevant for the Alliance. On the con-
trary, the issue led to sharp differences of opinion among its members as a direct
consequence of the debates within the UN Security Council on the conditions
for use of force under the UN Charter. In their Prague Summit Statement on Iraq
on 21 November 2002, NATO’s heads of state and government committed
themselves ‘to take effective action to assist and support the efforts of the UN to
ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq, without conditions or restric-
tions, with UNSCR 1441’ – implying that NATO, if necessary, would be pre-
pared to enforce by military means Iraqi compliance to UN Security Council
demands. Since then, US policy-makers, both in the administration and in Con-
gress, have been discussing the possibilities for a NATO role in Iraq, during
Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’, during the occupation, and after the formal transfer
of sovereignty at the end of June 2004. In mid-January 2003, the US adminis-
tration, formally requesting NATO support in case of an attack on Baghdad,
presented several ‘options’ for assistance.23 In February 2003, against the back-
ground of increasing build-up of troops in the area and growing disagreements
among the Allies, Turkey invoked Article 4 of the NATO Treaty.24 After much
controversy, the Allies decided to assist by providing air surveillance (AWACS),
deploying theatre anti-missile defences (Patriots) and NBC assets against the
possible use of weapons of mass destruction. In May 2003, shortly after the fall
of Saddam Hussein and the deployment of the Stabilization Force (SFIR), the
North Atlantic Council decided to accept Poland’s request for support in com-
manding one of the multinational divisions of SFIR, more or less along the lines
of the ‘technical assistance’, including force generation and logistics, that NATO
was giving to ISAF in Afghanistan. With the security situation in Iraq deterio-
rating, there was no consensus among NATO’s members about more support to
the coalition forces, which were operating under an occupation regime,25 not-
withstanding calls for such support in the US Congress in mid-2003. In Decem-
ber 2003, (then) US Secretary of State Colin Powell said that it was time to
‘begin examining what we might be able to do in Iraq beyond support of the
Polish Division’. One of the options, he said, might include having NATO
assume full command of the Polish-led sector in Iraq, coinciding with Spain’s
23. The options for protecting Turkey against Iraqi counter-attacks, ranging from the use of
AWACS aircraft, use of command facilities, and base and over-flight rights from NATO Allies,
were formally presented to the NAC.
24. Article 4 states that Allies will consult ‘whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial
integrity, political independence or security of any NATO country is threatened’.
25. S/RES/1483 (2003), 22 May 2003; and S/RES/1511 (2003), 16 October 2003.
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expected replacement as lead nation in August 2004.26 In March 2004, Jaap de
Hoop Scheffer also pointed out that ‘momentum is growing’ for the Alliance to
do more, especially in the perspective of the end of the formal occupation
period:
Should we do more? My answer to this question is clear: If a sovereign
Iraqi government, with the support of the United Nations, were to
request NATO to play a greater role, then we should do more. For I do
not see how we could abdicate our responsibilities if such a request were
made.27
In the following months, however, NATO shifted its focus towards a possible
contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq by setting up a training mission for
rebuilding Iraqi security forces after the formal transfer of authority to the new
Iraqi government in June 2004. NATO’s first concern at this stage of the deci-
sion-making process was to ensure that the political and international legal con-
ditions for possible deployment would be fulfilled. In adopting Resolution 1546
on 8 June 2004, the Security Council, ‘welcoming the beginning of a new phase
in Iraq’s transition to a democratically elected government, and looking forward
to the end of the occupation and the assumption of full responsibility and
authority by a fully sovereign and independent Interim Government of Iraq by
30 June 2004’, recognized that the multinational force, whose presence ‘is at the
request of the incoming Interim Government of Iraq’, would also assist ‘in build-
ing the capability of the Iraqi security forces and institutions, through a pro-
gramme of recruitment, training, equipping, mentoring, and monitoring’. In this
context, the Security Council requested member states and regional organiza-
tions to assist both the multinational force and the government of Iraq in build-
ing the necessary capabilities.28 Indeed, under these circumstances there was
broad consensus among NATO member states that the Alliance should play a
role in Iraq after the transfer of sovereignty from the occupying authorities (the
Coalition Provisional Authority) to the Iraqis at the end of June 2004, taking
into account the parameters of the sub-contracting model, including a formal
invitation by the new Iraqi government and authorization by the UN Security
Council.29 At its summit in Istanbul in June 2004, NATO decided ‘to offer
26. It is worthwhile to note that NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General
Ralston, already in August 2003 in an interview with Reuters, suggested that NATO would assume
command of the Polish-led force of 9,000 troops operating in south-central Iraq; Atlantic News,
No. 3502, 28 August 2003.
27. ‘NATO’s Transforming Agenda’, by NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, at the Dip-
lomatic Academy, Warsaw, 4 March 2004, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040304a.htm.
28. S/RES/1546 (2004), 8 June 2004.
29. Although strictly speaking, from an international legal point of view, such a formal authoriza-
tion would not be necessary once an official request has been made by the government of the host
state.
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assistance to the government of Iraq with the training of its security forces’,
without, however, clarifying for the time being the details of the mission. In a
separate statement that the heads of state and government issued on Iraq, they
fully supported the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of
the Republic of Iraq, adding that NATO ‘supports unreservedly’ Resolution
1546 of the UN Security Council and ‘offers its entire cooperation to the new
sovereign interim government in its efforts to strengthen internal security and
prepare for holding national elections in 2005.’30
Given the political sensitivities of a possible NATO presence on the ground
among the member states (related to security concerns, political will and avail-
ability of instructors), the mission’s modalities were extensively discussed within
NATO in the months to come, following intense diplomatic wrangling. While
the activation order for the mission was given on 15 December 2004 by
SACEUR, it would take until mid-February 2005 before NATO was officially
able to announce that all 26 member states would in some way participate in the
programme, either by dispatching instructors to Iraq or by training outside Iraq,
or by the provision of equipment or financial contributions. The agreement also
had a strong symbolic significance, reflecting the decision by NATO members,
in President Bush’s words, ‘to put the past behind them’, thereby pointing at the
sharp differences of opinion among the Allies during the war against Iraq.
NATO’s small training mission (with no more than 150 personnel), which is
specifically intended for the training of senior officers, would complement the
much larger training mission set up by the US-led multinational force to train
units of Iraqi soldiers and police officers.31 Both missions aim at building up
effective Iraqi security and police forces, thereby ultimately creating conditions
for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq’s territory as soon as circum-
stances would permit.32 In a statement read to the press by the Council’s Presi-
dent at the end of May 2005, Denmark’s ambassador to the UN said that the
Security Council members had discussed the mandate of the Multinational
Force in Iraq, authorizing an extension of its mandate ‘until the completion of
the political process’, welcoming ‘the progress made in recruiting, training and
30. Atlantic News, No. 3588, 29 June 2004.
31. NATO decided to establish a provisional training centre in Baghdad’s Green Zone instead of on
the outskirts of the city. It therefore needed less staff than the 300-person mission originally fore-
seen. The interim staff college should begin to ‘train the trainers’ in April 2005 and it was foreseen
that by September 2005 the Iraqi trainers would begin to give their first courses to Iraqi officers;
Atlantic News, No. 3654, 23 February 2005.
32. In April 2005, President Bush said that US forces would pull out of Iraq once the representative
government is in place. 150,000 members of the Iraqi security forces have been trained and
equipped, President Bush was quoted as saying by AFP, adding that at the moment the Iraqi army,
police and security forces exceed the US armed forces in number, which is the beginning of a ‘new
phase’ in US operations in Iraq, according to Bush; Atlantic News, No. 3668, 14 April 2005.
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equipping Iraqi security forces’, while looking forward ‘to those forces progres-
sively playing a greater role and ultimately assuming responsibility for Iraq’s
national security’, thus, again, explicitly endorsing NATO’s training mission.33
• Darfur
Since initial contact was made by phone at the end of August 2004 between the
Secretary-Generals of the UN and NATO, the UN Under-Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Operations called NATO in September 2004 to ‘ask what NATO
can do’, according to a NATO official.34 NATO’s Secretary-General reacted
favourably, committing himself to finding out what options NATO held. The
‘open request’, implying that each form of assistance would be welcome, paved
the way for close contacts in the months to come among the UN, NATO and the
European Union, and the African Union (AU) as the lead organization, and
establishment of a military mission, authorized by the Security Council and set
up to monitor the implementation of a cease-fire as agreed by the conflicting
parties in Darfur.35 It would take until April 2005 before the AU formally
requested NATO’s support. In the meantime, in January 2005 at a security con-
ference in Munich (Germany), Kofi Annan repeated his call to assist the AU in
its mission in Darfur, without, however, making a formal request. He stressed
that the AU’s ability to meet security needs was negligible compared to the size
of the challenge, saying: ‘People are dying every single day, while we fail to
protect them’, while adding, ‘Those organizations with real capacity – and
NATO as well as the EU are well represented in this room – must give serious
consideration’ to what they can do, he said.36 In March 2005, US Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice argued that if the AU was to request NATO support, she
hoped that NATO would provide it. Others, such as French Minister of Foreign
Affairs Michel Barnier, responded, however, by saying that he would prefer a
role for the EU, highlighting the experience gained by the EU in the Balkans and
the Democratic Republic of Congo. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer underlined that he was waiting for an initiative from the African Union.
At the end of the month, the African Union formally asked NATO for ‘logistic
support’ for its mission in Darfur. The request was made by the President of the
African Union in a letter addressed to the NATO Secretary-General.37 NATO
ambassadors agreed to look at the possibility of providing support through the
start of ‘exploratory discussions’ with the AU, realizing that if such support was
33. Press Release SC/8403, IK/495, 31 May 2005.
34. Atlantic News, No. 3607, 16 September 2004.
35. S/RES/1556, 30 July 2004.
36. Atlantic News, No. 3651, 15 February 2005.
37. Atlantic News, No. 3674, 28 April 2005.
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to happen, it would be the first time that NATO would be involved in a mission
on the African continent – alongside other international organizations, includ-
ing the UN and the EU.
The President of the AU announced his presence in Brussels on 17 May 2005,
both at NATO headquarters and to visit the EU for further discussions. After
the visit, NATO undertook to give an answer ‘as quickly as possible’ to the AU’s
request for logistical support. ‘The principle is, should be and will be that the
AU is leading the mission’, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said. The President of the AU
Commission, Oumar Konare, acknowledged that ‘we are fully aware that we
need support when it comes to capabilities and logistics’. More specifically, the
AU called for aid in order to strengthen logistics in terms of transport, housing,
training and communications, given the intentions to expand its mission from
2,000 to more than 7,700 troops in the course of the year.
At a special meeting in Addis Ababa to discuss the further deployment of the
mission, NATO’s Secretary-General stressed both the AU’s leadership regarding
Darfur and the need for close liaison with the AU and other donors, in part with
the EU, to ensure maximum complementarity and effectiveness. After explora-
tory contacts with the AU, NATO’s military authorities had identified three areas
in which the Alliance could do its part for the international assistance effort:
– first, we could help to deploy the AU forces, in particular in the field of
strategic airlift. NATO members indeed possess considerable airlift capabil-
ities and could set up an appropriate centre for such an operation;
– second, we could help to train the AMIS headquarters’ staff in important
areas such as command and control or operational planning;
– and finally, if the AU so wishes, we could assist in the field of intelligence
with training, for instance’.38
That same day, the North Atlantic Council agreed on these initial military
options for support to the African Union.39 The details still had to be worked
out after additional clarification of the AU’s needs. The decision opened the way
for NATO’s first mission to Africa, despite initial resistance from some mem-
bers, such as France and Belgium (both former colonial powers), which argued
38. ‘Speech by the Secretary-General at the Pledging Conference for the AU Mission in the Sudan’,
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26 May 2005, NATO Speeches.
39. Atlantic News, No. 3681, 26 May 2005. On the eve of a new meeting in the series of talks
between the AU, NATO, EU and UN in Addis Ababa, a number of former foreign ministers,
including Madeleine Albright, strongly urged NATO to make an even greater commitment to the
African mission, one that would include putting NATO troops on the ground under UN authoriza-
tion. In addition, they suggested, NATO should seek authority from the Security Council for a new
Chapter VII resolution establishing a no-flight zone over Darfur, which NATO aircraft would
enforce; International Herald Tribune, 26 May 2005.
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that support for the AU should come from the EU and not from NATO.40
NATO spokesman James Appathurai, emphasizing that the AU had always been
adamant about the presence of only African soldiers on the ground, said that
NATO (like the EU) would not send troops, adding that both organizations
would keep a low profile since neither Sudan nor the Arab League wanted West-
ern troops in Darfur.41
2005 World Summit Outcome
With the publication of his report In Larger Freedom, Kofi Annan opened the
floor for negotiations on his package of 101 recommendations among the UN’s
member states at the level of the General Assembly with a view to the World
Summit in September 2005 on the occasion of the UN’s sixtieth anniversary. The
‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ document, which was adopted at the end of the
three-day summit, contained two paragraphs on regional organizations.42 In the
context of peacekeeping, the report (in paragraph 93) stressed the importance
of ‘forging predictable partnerships and arrangements’ between the UN and
regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the Charter, supporting the efforts
of regional entities, including the European Union, ‘to develop capacities such
as for rapid deployment, stand-by and bridging arrangements’. Similarly, under
paragraph 170, the UN member states again supported ‘a stronger relationship’
between the UN and regional organizations, pursuant to Chapter VIII of the
Charter, resolving furthermore: (a) to expand consultation and cooperation
through ‘formalized agreements’ between the respective secretariats and the
involvement of regional organizations in the work of the Security Council; and
(b) to ensure that regional organizations that have a capacity for the prevention
of armed conflict and peacekeeping ‘consider the option’ of placing these capac-
ities in the framework of the UN Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS). With
the adoption of these two paragraphs, the UN member states have laid down,
for the time being, the framework for further development of the relationships
between the UN and the regional organizations, aimed at establishing ‘formal-
ized agreements’ and making available regional capacities for peacekeeping pur-
poses in the context of UNSAS. From the perspective of the relationship between
40. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was quoted as saying: ‘NATO and the EU are entering into a very good
example of what I would say is practical and pragmatic cooperation. Let’s not have theology. Let’s
do it. The AU came to NATO and the AU came to the EU. There is no room for competition. There
is plenty of work to be done … The decision could … also be an important test case for much
closer cooperation between NATO and the EU’; International Herald Tribune, 9 June 2005.
41. Although the AU had always been adamant about the presence of only African soldiers on the
ground, NATO support could possibly require the presence of a few soldiers, NATO sources
stated; Atlantic News, No. 3681, 26 May 2005.
42. Document A/60/L.1, 15 September 2005.
academia-egmont.papers.10.book  Page 23  Wednesday, November 23, 2005  11:34 AMUN REFORM AND NATO TRANSFORMATION: THE MISSING LINK
24
the UN and regional organizations, the political relevance of these suggestions,
while in line with Kofi Annan’s initial recommendations, is extremely limited
and disappointing, the more so for NATO. The document nowhere explicitly
refers to NATO, bypassing altogether the quite extensive and relatively unique
dimensions of its close forms of actual cooperation in the field, and despite Kofi
Annan’s own calls on the Alliance for support to the UN and NATO’s willing-
ness to go ‘beyond ad hoc cooperation on the ground’. The best that one can say
in this respect is that the mention in paragraph 93 of the Outcome Document of
‘bridging arrangements’ implies an indirect reference to NATO.
Conclusion
Since the end of the Second World War in 1945, the international political sys-
tem has seen two major turning-points: the end of the Cold War; and the terror
attack of ‘9/11’. Both events have had a profound impact on the position and
performance of NATO, including the formulation and implementation of ‘trans-
formation agendas’ in completely different security environments. The end of
the Cold War has contributed to defining the contours of NATO’s institutional
and operational relations with the United Nations, highlighting its inherently
ambivalent character as a collective defence organization, which is also willing
and capable of performing as an instrument of the collective security system, as
embodied in the UN Charter. The contours were shaped as a result of NATO’s
performance in Bosnia, both before and after the signing of the Dayton Peace
Agreement, Operation ‘Allied Force’ and the deployment of KFOR in Kosovo,
and its presence in Macedonia in supporting the implementation of the Ohrid
Agreement. This series of consecutive missions can be construed in two ‘mod-
els’: the so-called sub-contracting model; and the autonomy model. Under the
sub-contracting model, the Atlantic Alliance is prepared, responding to a
request of the UN, to assist in the implementation of Security Council resolu-
tions, while recognizing the Council’s primacy in maintaining international
peace and security under the UN Charter. NATO’s decision, however, in 1999
to execute Operation ‘Allied Force’ in Kosovo, according to its own rules under
the autonomy model, made clear that the Alliance basically reserves its right as
a collective defence organization to use force without the explicit authorization
of the Security Council – a decision that was formalized in NATO’s 1999 New
Strategic Concept. The message was clear: while NATO is prepared to act
within the parameters of the sub-contracting model, the bottom line is that it is
not willing to subordinate itself to the UN under all conditions. The Kosovo
debate, heated as it was, to a large extent was reminiscent of the discussions in
1949 among NATO’s founding fathers about the wording of the preamble to
NATO’s treaty in the run-up to the establishment of the Alliance.
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The two models, as developed in the 1990s, have thus laid down the framework
for the relationships between NATO and the UN in the aftermath of ‘9/11’.
NATO’s current transformation agenda is determined by international terrorism
as the main security threat of the twenty-first century. This might very well lead
to a shift from the sub-contracting model of the 1990s to a renewed focus on the
autonomy model, with more emphasis on NATO’s character as a collective
defence organization and its right to self-defence under Article 5 of the Wash-
ington Treaty. Responding to the terrorist attacks of ‘9/11’, NATO’s decision to
invoke this article for the first time in its history is still operational, as illustrated
by the recent decision to expand Operation ‘Active Endeavour’ to cover the
whole of the Mediterranean Sea.43 NATO’s position as an autonomous instru-
ment in the fight against international terrorism was also underlined by its wish
(as expressed in Reykjavik in May 2002) to become a ‘global player’, capable of
acting wherever forces are needed,44 leaving behind its ‘out-of-area’ syndrome,
and the acceptance of the concept of pre-emptive attacks, which is in line with
the US national security strategy. At the same time, NATO’s involvement in ISAF
fits perfectly in the so-called sub-contracting model, just like the (initial) idea to
task NATO with the command of a multinational force in Iraq after the end of
the occupation regime. Although the latter task did not materialize, NATO’s
training mission in Iraq is similarly being embedded within the same framework,
including an explicit request from the acting government of the host-nation and
formal authorization by the UN Security Council. What is striking is that all of
these developments reflect a certain eagerness on the part of NATO, or so it
seems to me, to take on new responsibilities in the aftermath of ‘9/11’ as part of
its transformation agenda. In the case of Afghanistan, NATO offered support to
Turkey, even before Turkey itself had taken a decision about accepting a ‘lead
nation’ role, followed by similar offers to other member states, and its willing-
ness to take over full command of ISAF. In the case of Iraq, NATO committed
itself to enforcing Security Council demands in the case of non-compliance by
Saddam Hussein, assisted Poland in its role in SFIR, operating under an occu-
pation regime, has been considering taking over the command of a multina-
tional force as soon as the occupation regime comes to an end, and is currently
involved in a training mission in parallel with the US-led Stabilization Force in
Iraq (SFIR). It is surprising to note how these far-reaching decisions have been,
43. NATO’s AWACS support to the US ended in April 2002; Atlantic News, No. 3379.
44. N. Burns in the International Herald Tribune wrote that in 2003 NATO added vital new mili-
tary capabilities that ‘will revolutionize our strategic reach’, thus underlining two accomplish-
ments: on 1 December 2003 NATO inaugurated the new Czech-led CBRN battalion, which is
designed to safeguard ‘our’ civilian populations from a WMD attack; and on 1 October 2003 the
Alliance launched the new NATO Reaction Force, which will for the first time in its history give
NATO a quick-reaction force for hostage rescue, peace interventions and combat operations far
from Europe’.
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and are being, taken and implemented without a serious public debate on
NATO’s transformation agenda.
No less surprising are other ambitions that have been put forward in the slip-
stream of these decisions. In June 2003 during their semi-annual conference,
there was much public speculation among NATO’s foreign ministers, including
(then) Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs de Hoop Scheffer, on opening new
horizons, such as a NATO role in a possible peace agreement between Israel and
the Palestinians. When in early 2005 the time seemed ripe for new initiatives in
the Middle East in the aftermath of the death of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat,
there was again a new round of speculation about a possible role for NATO as
a guarantor of a peace settlement. While Jaap de Hoop Scheffer expressed him-
self ‘personally in favour’ of such a role, taking into account a number of pre-
conditions, including in the first place a peace agreement, consent of the parties
and UN authorization, it was clear that the question of NATO’s role in the
conflict had never been formally discussed at NATO. But the tone had been set,
taking into account what de Hoop Scheffer on a visit to Israel had called ‘the
strategic imperative’ of the interplay of Middle Eastern and transatlantic secu-
rity.45 At the summit in Istanbul in June 2004, NATO – following its decision at
Prague in 2002 to upgrade the so-called Mediterranean Dialogue involving
seven countries from the Middle East and North Africa – invited its partners to
establish a more ambitious and expanded partnership. At the same time, it
offered cooperation to the broader Middle East region by launching its ‘Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative’, starting with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation
Council. Both initiatives aim at enhancing security and stability in the region.46
In March 2004, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan quite unexpectedly called
upon NATO to support the UN in Africa, saying that if the UN undertakes new
peacekeeping operations in Africa, support from NATO would be ‘tremen-
dously helpful’. Annan welcomed the willingness of the Alliance to ‘go global’,
citing its recent work in Afghanistan as an example. Anticipating ‘a surge’ of
new peacekeeping operations across Africa in the year ahead, he added:
NATO might be employed in a ‘peace enforcement’ role, much as the
European Union deployed ‘Operation Artemis’ in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) as a bridging force before the deployment
of a UN operation.47
45. Atlantic News, No. 3639, 6 January 2005.
46. ‘The Istanbul Declaration: Our Security in a New Era’, issued by the heads of state and govern-
ment participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul on 28 June 2004,
Atlantic News, No. 3589 (Annexe), 30 June 2004.
47. ‘Annan Invites NATO Support for Anticipated African Peacekeeping Missions’, UN News Cen-
tre, 9 March 2004.
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At the time, Annan also praised NATO’s preparedness to send troops to Iraq if
requested. While thus welcoming the role of NATO as a ‘global player’, he
added that the UN and NATO would continue to discuss the world’s collective
security system as well as peace-support operations. One year later, in January
2005, Kofi Annan again urged NATO to consider seriously becoming active in
Africa, this time, however, by assisting the African Union in its mission in Dar-
fur. Annan’s calls for greater NATO involvement in Africa were made against
the background of increasing cooperation between the UN and regional organ-
izations that were focused on either seeking direct support to the UN by deploy-
ing before, alongside, or after a UN operation, or the long-term enhancement of
regional and sub-regional organizations’ capacity for peacekeeping, particularly
in Africa (giving as examples Ivory Coast and Liberia – ECOWAS – and the
Democratic Republic of Congo – the European Union). In this context, Annan
spoke of the need to reinforce ‘strategic partnerships’ with regional organiza-
tions.48 Two months later, Jean-Marie Guehenno, UN Under-Secretary-General
for Peacekeeping, presented a plan to strengthen UN peacekeeping through the
rise of what he termed ‘partnership peacekeeping’ – the UN working alongside
regional organizations like NATO, the EU and ECOWAS.49 Without giving fur-
ther details, in In Larger Freedom Kofi Annan called for the establishment of an
‘interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities’ as part of the UN System of
Standby Arrangements (UNSAS), through ‘partnerships’ with regional organi-
zations. Taking into account the conceptual and operational limits of UNSAS,
the High-level Panel’s report, which argued in favour of formalizing more the
UN’s relations with its regional partners, was more ambitious than Annan in his
report. And even Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was much more outspoken when,
responding to Annan’s recommendations, he underlined the need to develop
‘structured relationships at the institutional level’ between NATO and the UN,
in order to ‘coordinate strategically, [and] not just cooperate tactically’.
In terms of the actual cooperation between the two organizations, in its deploy-
ments in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, NATO already went far beyond
the scope of the so-called ‘interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities’. Other
than by calling for ‘a decisive step forward’, with his recommendation on the
establishment of ‘an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities’, Annan
basically set the clock some ten years back. In the early 1990s, after an extensive
discussion on the idea of the establishment of a UN rapid reaction force in the
aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda, the Security Council made it clear that
‘the first priority in improving the capacity for rapid deployment should be the
further enhancement of the existing stand-by arrangements’, thereby declining
48. UN News Centre, 27 February 2004.
49. International Herald Tribune, 20 April 2004.
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any initiative beyond the UN Standby Arrangement System for peacekeeping
operations.50
Where Annan is extremely reluctant in recommending further formalization of
the relations between the UN and regional organizations beyond ‘peacekeep-
ing’, there is an additional reason for him when it comes to the relationship
between the UN and NATO. This has to do with NATO’s ‘status aparte’ among
the so-called ‘regional organizations’ – outside the purview of Chapter VIII of
the UN Charter. While NATO in the last decade has presented itself as a pow-
erful military instrument of the UN’s collective security system, it has simultane-
ously made it abundantly clear that, given its character as a collective defence
organization, it retains the right under all circumstances to use force without
UN Security Council authorization, thereby neglecting the Council’s primacy in
maintaining international peace and security. Both organizations could continue
with ‘business as usual’ on the ground, without any further formalization of
their mutual relationships. Looking at NATO’s future, however, one can assume
that the Alliance will increase its out-of-area missions. Anticipating more calls
for assistance in the years ahead, US Ambassador Nicolas Burns, in early 2005,
thought it highly likely that ‘in one or two years from now, most NATO troops
will be outside Europe’.51
This raises the question of whether there is greater need than ever before to
formalize relationships between the two organizations as the missing link
between UN reform and the transformation of NATO.52 Nevertheless, as far as
the UN-NATO relationship is concerned, the 2005 World Summit Outcome
document seems to suggest that there is no need to go beyond ad hoc coopera-
tion on the ground – no need for fresh thinking whatsoever, in other words. At
the same time, one should not dramatize the outcome: it will not prevent the UN
and NATO from future forms of cooperation along the (ad hoc) lines of the past,
reflecting both organizations’ interests.
50. Dick A. Leurdijk (ed.), A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: Strengthening the Capacity for
Quick Response (The Hague: Netherlands Institute for International Affairs ‘Clingendael’, 1995),
p. 11.
51. Atlantic News, No. 3641, 13 January 2005.
52. The Outcome Document, used as a basis for the deliberations in the General Assembly on the
recommendations of Kofi Annan, supports a ‘stronger relationship’ between the UN and (sub-
)regional organizations ‘pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter’, suggesting to ‘Expand consulta-
tion and cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organizations through formal-
ized agreements between respective secretariats, regularized involvement of regional organizations
in the work of the Security Council, and participation of relevant regional organizations in the
Peace-building Commission’. For a comparison of the paragraphs on regional organizations in the
three reports of the High-level Panel, Kofi Annan and the Outcome Document, see Annexe 1.
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Annex I
Relevant paragraphs on regional organizations 
from reports/documents
High-level Panel Report
272. Recent experience has demonstrated that regional organizations can be a vital part
of the multilateral system. Their efforts need not contradict United Nations efforts, nor
do they absolve the United Nations of its primary responsibilities for peace and security.
The key is to organize regional action within the framework of the Charter and the pur-
poses of the United Nations, and to ensure that the United Nations and any regional
organization with which it works do so in a more integrated fashion than has up to now
occurred. This will require that:
• Authorization from the Security Council should in all cases be sought for regional
peace operations, recognizing that in some urgent situations that authorization may
be sought after such operations have commenced;
• Consultation and cooperation between the United Nations and regional organiza-
tions should be expanded and could be formalized in an agreement, covering such
issues as meetings of the heads of the organizations, more frequent exchange of infor-
mation and early warning, co -training of civilian and military personnel, and
exchange of personnel within peace operations;
• In the case of African regional and subregional capacities, donor countries should
commit to a 10-year process of sustained capacity-building support, within the Afri-
can Union strategic framework;
• Regional organizations that have a capacity for conflict prevention or peacekeeping
should place such capacities in the framework of the United Nations Standby
Arrangements System;
• Member States should agree to allow the United Nations to provide equipment sup-
port from United Nations-owned sources to regional operations, as needed;
• The rules for the United Nations peacekeeping budget should be amended to give the
United Nations the option on a case-by-case basis to finance regional operations
authorized by the Security Council with assessed contributions. 
273. In recent years, such alliance organizations as NATO ( ) have undertaken peace-
keeping operations beyond their mandated areas. We welcome this so long as these oper-
ations are authorized by and accountable to the Security Council. In the case of NATO,
there may also be a constructive role for it to play in assisting in the training and equip-
ping of less well resourced regional organizations and States.
In Larger Freedom Report
112. I appeal to Member States to do more to ensure that the United Nations has effective
capacities for peacekeeping, commensurate with the demands that they place upon it. In
particular, I urge them to improve our deployment options by creating strategic reserves
that can be deployed rapidly, within the framework of United Nations arrangements.
United Nations capacity should not be developed in competition with the admirable
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efforts now being made by many regional organizations but in cooperation with them.
Decisions by the European Union to create standby battle groups, for instance, and by
the African Union to create African reserve capacities, are a very valuable complement to
our own efforts. Indeed, I believe the time is now ripe for a decisive move forward: the
establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the
United Nations to work with relevant regional organizations in predictable and reliable
partnerships.
213. A considerable number of regional and subregional organizations are now active
around the world, making important contributions to the stability and prosperity of their
members, as well as of the broader international system. The United Nations and
regional organizations should play complementary roles in facing the challenges to inter-
national peace and security. In this connection, donor countries should pay particular
attention to the need for a 10-year plan for capacity-building with the African Union. To
improve coordination between the United Nations and regional organizations, within the
framework of the Charter of the United Nations, I intend to introduce memoranda of
understanding between the United Nations and individual organizations, governing the
sharing of information, expertise and resources, as appropriate in each case. For regional
organizations that have a conflict prevention or peacekeeping capacity, these memoranda
of understanding could place those capacities within the framework of the United
Nations Standby Arrangements System.
214. I also intend to invite regional organizations to participate in meetings of United
Nations system coordinating bodies, when issues in which they have a particular interest
are discussed.
215. The rules of the United Nations peacekeeping budget should be amended to give the
United Nations the option, in very exceptional circumstances, to use assessed contribu-
tions to finance regional operations authorized by the Security Council, or the participa-
tion of regional organizations in multi-pillar peace operations under the overall United
Nations umbrella.
2005 World Summit Outcome
93. Recognizing the important contribution to peace and security by regional organiza-
tions as provided for under Chapter VIII of the Charter and the importance of forging
predictable partnerships and arrangements between the United Nations and regional
organizations, and noting in particular, given the special needs of Africa, the importance
of a strong African Union: 
(a) We support the efforts of the European Union and other regional entities to develop
capacities such as for rapid deployment, standby and bridging arrangements;
(b) We support the development and implementation of a ten-year plan for capacity-
building with the African Union.
170. We support a stronger relationship between the United Nations and regional and
subregional organizations, pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter, and therefore
resolve:
(a) To expand consultation and cooperation between the United Nations and regional
and subregional organizations through formalized agreements between the respec-
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tive secretariats and, as appropriate, involvement of regional organizations in the
work of the Security Council;
(b) To ensure that regional organizations that have a capacity for the prevention of
armed conflict or peacekeeping consider the option of placing such capacity in the
framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System;
(c) To strengthen cooperation in the areas of economic, social and cultural fields.
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Annex II
Paragraphs from United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
relevant for NATO
AFGHANISTAN
Resolution 1386, 20 December 2001
The Security Council,
Reiterating its endorsement of the Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghani-
stan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions, signed in Bonn
on 5 December 2001 (S/2001 /1 154) (the Bonn Agreement),
Taking note of the request to the Security Council in Annex 1, paragraph 3, to the Bonn
Agreement to consider authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of an interna-
tional security force, as well as the briefing on 14 December 2001 by the Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General on his contacts with the Afghan authorities in which
they welcome the deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations-authorized interna-
tional security force.
Welcoming the letter from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General
of 19 December 2001 (S/2001/1217), and taking note of the United Kingdom offer con-
tained therein to take the lead in organizing and commanding an International Security
Assistance Force,
Determining that the situation in Afghanistan still constitutes a threat to international
peace and security,
Determined to ensure the full implementation of the mandate of the International Secu-
rity Assistance Force, in consultation with the Afghan Interim Authority established by
the Bonn Agreement,
Acting for these reasons under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Authorizes,  as envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement, the establishment for 6
months of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim
Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that
the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can
operate in a secure environment;
2. Calls  upon  Member States to contribute personnel, equipment and other resources
to the International Security Assistance Force, and invites those Member States to
inform the leadership of the Force and the Secretary-General;
3. Authorizes  the Member States participating in the International Security Assistance
Force to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate;
4. Calls  upon  the International Security Assistance Force to work in close consultation
with the Afghan Interim Authority in the implementation of the force mandate, as
well as with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;
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5. Calls upon all Afghans to cooperate with the International Security Assistance Force
and relevant international governmental and non-governmental organizations, and
welcomes the commitment of the parties to the Bonn Agreement to do all within
their means and influence to ensure security, including to ensure the safety, security
and freedom of movement of all United Nations personnel and all other personnel
of international governmental and non-governmental organizations deployed in
Afghanistan;
6. Takes note of the pledge made by the Afghan parties to the Bonn Agreement in
Annex I to that Agreement to withdraw all military units from Kabul, and calls upon
them to implement this pledge in cooperation with the International Security Assist-
ance Force;
7. Encourages neighbouring States and other Member States to provide to the Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force such necessary assistance as may be requested,
including the provision of overflight clearances and transit;
8. Stresses that the expenses of the International Security Assistance Force will be borne
by the participating Member States concerned, requests the Secretary-General to
establish a trust fund through which contributions could be channelled to the Mem-
ber States or operations concerned, and encourages Member States to contribute to
such a fund;
9. Requests the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force to provide
periodic reports on progress towards the implementation of its mandate through the
Secretary-General;
10. Calls on Member States participating in the International Security Assistance Force
to provide assistance to help the Afghan Interim Authority in the establishment and
training of new Afghan security and armed forces;
Resolution 1510, 13 October 2003
The Security Council,
Recognizing that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout
the country resides with the Afghans themselves and welcoming the continuing coopera-
tion of the Afghan Transitional Authority with the International Security Assistance
Force,
Reaffirming the importance of the Bonn Agreement and recalling in particular its annex
1 which, inter alia, provides for the progressive expansion of the International Security
Assistance Force to other urban centres and other areas beyond Kabul,
Stressing also the importance of extending central government authority to all parts of
Afghanistan, of comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all
armed factions, and of security sector reform including reconstitution of the new Afghan
National Army and Police,
Recognizing the constraints upon the full implementation of the Bonn Agreement result-
ing from concerns about the security situation in parts of Afghanistan,
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Noting the letter dated 10 October 2003 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghan-
istan (S/2003/986, annex) requesting the assistance of the International Security Assist-
ance Force outside Kabul,
Noting the letter dated 6 October 2003 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) to the Secretary-General (S/2003/970) regarding a possible
expansion of the mission of the International Security Assistance Force,
Determining that the situation in Afghanistan still constitutes a threat to international
peace and security,
Determined to ensure the full implementation of the mandate of the International Secu-
rity Assistance Force, in consultation with the Afghan Transitional Authority and its
successors.
Acting for these reasons under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1.  Authorizes expansion of the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force
to allow it, as resources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its
successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul
and its environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United
Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in recon-
struction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to pro-
vide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn
Agreement;
2. Calls upon the International Security Assistance Force to continue to work in close
consultation with the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors and the Spe-
cial Representative of the Secretary-General as well as with the Operation Enduring
Freedom Coalition in the implementation of the force mandate, and to report to the
Security Council on the implementation of the measures set out in paragraph 1;
3. Decides  also  to extend the authorization of the International Security Assistance
Force, as defined in resolution 1386 (2001) and this resolution, for a period of twelve
months;
4. Authorizes the Member States participating in the International Security Assistance
Force to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate:
5. Requests the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force to provide
quarterly reports on the implementation of its mandate to the Security Council
through the Secretary-General;
Resolution 1563,17 September 2004
The Security Council,
Recognizing that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout
the country resides with the Afghans themselves and welcoming the continuing coopera-
tion of the Afghan Transitional Administration with the International Security Assistance
Force,
Reaffirming the importance of the Bonn Agreement and the Berlin Declaration, and
recalling in particular annex 1 of the Bonn Agreement which, inter alia, provides for the
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progressive expansion of the International Security Assistance Force to other urban cen-
tres and other areas beyond Kabul.
Stressing also the importance of extending central government authority to all parts of
Afghanistan, of conducting free and fair elections, of comprehensive disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration of all armed factions, of justice sector reform, of secu-
rity sector reform including reconstitution of the Afghan National Army and Police, and
combating narcotics trade and production, and recognizing certain progress that has
been made in these and other areas with the help of the international community,
Recognizing the constraints upon the full implementation of the Bonn Agreement result-
ing from concerns about the security situation in parts of Afghanistan, in particular in
the light of the upcoming elections,
Welcoming in this context the commitment by NATO lead nations to establish further
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), as well as the readiness of the International
Security Assistance Force and the Operation Enduring Freedom Coalition to assist in
securing the conduct of national elections,
Expressing ils appreciation to Eurocorps for taking over the lead from Canada in com-
manding the International Security Assistance Force, to Canada for its leadership of the
International Security Assistance Force during the past year, and recognizing with grati-
tude the contributions of many nations to the International Security Assistance Force.
Determining that the situation in Afghanistan still constitutes a threat to international
peace and security,
Determined to ensure the full implementation of the mandate of the International Secu-
rity Assistance Force, in consultation with the Afghan Transitional Administration and
its successors,
Acting for these reasons under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides  to extend the authorization of the International Security Assistance Force,
as defined in resolution 1386 (2001) and 1510 (2003), for a period of twelve months
beyond 13 October 2004:
2. Authorizes  the Member States participating in the International Security Assistance
Force to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate:
3. Recognizes  the need to strengthen the International Security Assistance Force, and in
this regard calls upon Member States to contribute personnel, equipment and other
resources to the International Security Assistance Force, and to make contributions
to the Trust Fund established pursuant to resolution 1386 (2001);
4. Calls  upon  the International Security Assistance Force to continue to work in close
consultation with the Afghan Transitional Administration and its successors and the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General as well as with the Operation Endur-
ing Freedom Coalition in the implementation of the force mandate;
5. Requests  the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force to provide
quarterly reports on implementation of its mandate to the Security Council through
the Secretary-General;
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IRAQ
Resolution 1483, 22 May 2003
The Security Council,
Noting the letter of 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United States
of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Presi-
dent of the Security Council (S/2003/538) and recognizing the specific authorities,
responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these states as
occupying powers under unified command (the ìAuthorityî),
Noting further that other States that are not occupying powers are working now or in
the future may work under the Authority,
Welcoming further the willingness of Member States to contribute to stability and secu-
rity in Iraq by contributing personnel, equipment, and other resources under the Author-
ity,
Determining that the situation in Iraq, although improved, continues to constitute a
threat to international peace and security,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1.  Appeals to Member States and concerned organizations to assist the people of Iraq
in their efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their country, and to contrib-
ute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq in accordance with this resolution;
4.  Calls upon the Authority, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and
other relevant international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through
the effective administration of the territory, including in particular working towards
the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions
in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future;
26.  Calls upon Member States and international and regional organizations to contrib-
ute to the implementation of this resolution;
Resolution 1511, 16 October 2003
The Security Council,
Recognizing that international support for restoration of conditions of stability and secu-
rity is essential to the well-being of the people of Iraq as well as to the ability of all
concerned to carry out their work on behalf of the people of Iraq, and welcoming Mem-
ber State contributions in this regard under resolution 1483 (2003),
Determining that the situation in Iraq, although improved, continues to constitute a
threat to international peace and security,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1.  Reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, and underscores, in that
context, the temporary nature of the exercise by the Coalition Provisional Authority
(Authority) of the specific responsibilities, authorities, and obligations under appli-
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cable international law recognized and set forth in resolution 1483 (2003), which
will cease when an internationally recognized, representative government established
by the people of Iraq is sworn in and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority,
inter alia through steps envisaged in paragraphs 4 through 7 and 10 below;
13. Determines that the provision of security and stability is essential to the successful
completion of the political process as outlined in paragraph 7 above and to the abil-
ity of the United Nations to contribute effectively to that process and the implemen-
tation of resolution 1483 (2003), and authorizes a multinational force under unified
command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security
and stability in Iraq, including for the purpose of ensuring necessary conditions for
the implementation of the timetable and programme as well as to contribute to the
security of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, the Governing Council
of Iraq and other institutions of the Iraqi interim administration, and key humani-
tarian and economic infrastructure;
16. Emphasizes the importance of establishing effective Iraqi police and security forces
in maintaining law, order, and security and combating terrorism consistent with par-
agraph 4 of resolution 1483 (2003), and calls upon Member States and international
and regional organizations to contribute to the training and equipping of Iraqi police
and security forces;
DARFUR
Resolution 1556, 30 July 2004
The Security Council,
Welcoming the leadership role and the engagement of the African Union to address the
situation in Darfur and expressing its readiness to support fully these efforts,
Expressing its determination to do everything possible to halt a humanitarian catastro-
phe, including by taking further action if required,
Determining that the situation in Sudan constitutes a threat to international peace and
security and to stability in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
2. Endorses the deployment of international monitors, including the protection force
envisioned by the African Union, to the Darfur region of Sudan under the leadership
of the African Union and urges the international community to continue to support
these efforts, welcomes the progress made in deploying monitors, including the
offers to provide forces by members of the African Union, and stresses the need for
the Government of Sudan and all involved parties to facilitate the work of the mon-
itors in accordance with the N’Djamena ceasefire agreement and with the Addis
Ababa agreement of 28 May 2004 on the modalities of establishing an observer
mission to monitor the ceasefire;
3. Urges member states to reinforce the international monitoring team, led by the Afri-
can Union, including the protection force, by providing personnel and other assist-
ance including financing, supplies, transport, vehicles, command support, communi-
cations and headquarters support as needed for the monitoring operation, and wel-
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comes the contributions already made by the European Union and the United States
to support the African Union led operation;
16. Expresses its full support for the African Union-led ceasefire commission and mon-
itoring mission in Darfur, and requests the Secretary-General to assist the African
Union with planning and assessments for its mission in Darfur, and in accordance
with the Joint Communiqué to prepare to support implementation of a future agree-
ment in Darfur in close cooperation with the African Union and requests the Secre-
tary-General to report to the Security Council on progress;
Resolution 1564, 18 September 2004
The Security Council,
Welcoming the 6 September 2004 letter to the President of the Security Council from the
President of the African Union, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, including his
appeal for international support for the extension of the African Union Mission in Dar-
fur,
Determining that the situation in Sudan constitutes a threat to international peace and
security and to stability in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
2.  Welcomes and supports the intention of the African Union to enhance and augment
its monitoring mission in the Darfur region of Sudan, and encourages the undertak-
ing of proactive monitoring;
3.  Urges Member States to support the African Union in these efforts including by pro-
viding all equipment, logistical, financial, material, and other resources necessary to
support the rapid expansion of the African Union Mission and by supporting the
efforts of the African Union aimed at a peaceful conclusion of the crisis and the
protection of the welfare of the people of Darfur, welcomes the Government of
Sudan’s request to the African Union to increase its monitoring presence in Darfur
in its 9 September 2004 letter to the Security Council, and urges the Government of
Sudan to take all steps necessary to follow through with this commitment and to
cooperate fully with the African Union to ensure a secure and stable environment;
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